Numbers Performing Nature in Quantitative Valuing by Verran, Helen
Title Numbers Performing Nature in QuantitativeValuing
Author(s) Verran, Helen
Citation Nature Culture. 2 P.23-P.37
Issue Date 2013
Text Version publisher
URL https://doi.org/10.18910/75514
DOI 10.18910/75514
rights
Note
Osaka University Knowledge Archive : OUKA
https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/repo/ouka/all/
Osaka University
 
H. Verran. Numbers Performing Nature in Quantitative Valuing 
23 
NatureCulture 2013 
Copyright owned by the authors 
Numbers Performing Nature in 
Quantitative Valuing 
Helen Verran 
University of Melbourne 
Introduction 
The poster reproduced below appeared in a document, published in 2011 by a left-
leaning Australian think-tank, that successfully proposed a new policy for Australia’s 
fisheries: Stocking Up: Securing our marine economy.1Policy proposals very similar 
to those elaborated here were, in fact, announced by the Australian minister for the 
environment on 15th June, 2012.2 
The poster displays a series of numbers, expressions of quantitative values. 
Clearly, the authors feel that these series of numbers adequately summarize their 
argument. In this paper, I examine and critique the performance of some of the 
numbers displayed. To disentangle some of the confusion around numbers, nature, 
and values expressed in government policy, I characterize some of the epistemo-
cultural properties of the use of numbers on the poster. My interest is in the good-
faith, informed use of numbers by social scientists. I am not criticizing the policy 
that the numbers in this poster have been assembled to support. On the contrary, I 
fully support the policy and applaud the political courage of the environment 
minister who has committed himself to getting the policy enacted as law. 
                                                            
1 Eadie & Hoisington(2011) 
2  http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political‐news/stormy‐waters‐for‐marine‐park‐plan‐20120614‐
20d3v.html#ixzz21rZwNQp0 Accessed 28 July, 2012. 
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Most of the numbers displayed in the poster are backward looking and act as 
truth claims. These are orthodox ‘modern fact numbers’3: for example, 15 per cent, 
“the decline in the rate of growth of long-lived corals in the Great Barrier Reef”. Two 
numbers are different to the others: one is future-focused—42 per cent, ‘the projected 
increase in the value of production of sustainably managed Australian fisheries in 20 
years, if international fish stocks collapse”; and the other is present-focused—A$25 
billion, “the estimated annual production value marine ecosystem services provide to 
the Australian economy”. Both numbers purport to perform truth claims, but in 
neither case can the implicit claim to be evidence of a truth be supported.  
Why should it be of interest to investigate the quantitative valuing 
performance of numbers presented as a set to achieve a particular political 
purpose? I argue that quantitative valuing is a particular form of ordering. As a set, 
the numbers on the poster promote a particular epistemo-cultural order that 
expresses a particular form of nature and (incidentally) a particular political 
agenda. Whereas we usually think of nature as structure within which human 
cultures emerge, my examination of the performance of the numbers in this poster 
reveals nature can be regarded as infrastructure. 
This rather surprising outcome of investigating the performative aspect of 
numbers—disclosing nature as a form of ordering, a form of infrastructure—
explicates a claim made by Foucault at the start of his investigation into the 
governmentality under liberalism and neo-liberalism. “Nature is something that 
runs under, through, and in the exercise of governmentality. It is, if you like, its 
indispensable hypodermis. It is the other face of something whose visible face, 
visible for the governors, is their own action. Their action has underside, or 
rather it has another face, and this other face of governmentality, its specific 
necessity, is precisely what political economy studies. It is not background 
but a permanent correlative.”4 
Relational empiricism: quantitative valuing as ordering, and the 
epistemo-cultural properties of numbers 
The claim that quantitative valuing is a form of ordering, and the claim that numbers 
purporting to represent values have epistemo-cultural properties are valid as claims 
about collective life only if we adopt relational empiricism as our analytic framework. 
Neither claim can be understood using the more orthodox analytic framework of 
                                                            
3 “Numbers have come to epitomize the modern fact… somehow non‐interpretive [in valuing] at the 
same time as they have become the bedrock [order] of systematic knowledge” (Poovey 1998: xii). 
4 Foucault (2008: 16) 
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Figure 1. Poster with numbers included in the prologue of Stocking Up: Securing 
our marine economy5 
                                                            
5 Eadie & Hoisington(2011) 
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foundational empiricism.6 Relational empiricism is my preferred characterization of 
a family of analytic framings that began to emerge in science studies and 
anthropology in the late 1980s, often with arcane names, for example: actor-
network theory; sociology of translation; modest witnessing; Melanesian eversion; 
material semiotics; postcolonial imaginary of emergence; and baroque analysis.7 
When considering alternative ways to describe African popular economies, I 
first used the term relational empiricism in 2007.8 African economies are often 
intractable when subjected to the analytic categories of Western economic theories, 
and are consequently often despaired of in global economic circles as “hopeless”.9 
Similarly in the 1970s, inconducive to analysis using the categories of Western 
philosophy, African thought was written off as “primitive”.10 My response to the 
inability to explain is to insist that the problem lies not with Africa, but rather with 
analytical Western academic traditions, in particular, with an ongoing commitment 
to foundational empiricism. 11  Accordingly, I proposed the analytic framing of 
relational empiricism, characterized by explicit and very different metaphysical 
commitments. In 2007, settling on ‘relational empiricism’ for the analytic I had 
more fully elaborated in 2001 as a postcolonial imaginary of emergence, I showed 
how African economic agents and anthropologists who study those agents , in their 
various analyses (undertaken for very different purposes) are both mobilizing 
relational empiricism. Here I re-iterate in terms less tied to the phenomena of 
African economies, my previous characterization of relational empiricism. 
                                                            
6  I  style  this  a  non‐reductive  realistic  analytic  framing  that  disavows  both  a  materialist 
foundationism (Verran 2001: 34) and an idealist correlationism (Meillassoux 2009: 5). I adopt the 
term from Deleuze. “This form of non‐reductive empiricism is analogous to Deleuze’s description 
of  an  additive  and  relational  empiricism  (Deleuze  and  Parnet  2002:  57).  The  ‘relations’  of 
relational empiricism originate in the workings of happenings that are standardized in some form . 
I have previously called such repeatable happenings ‘microworlds’ (Verran 2001: 47).   
7 Actor network theory (ANT) is associated especially with Latour; sociology of translation was the 
description most  commonly used by M. Callon; modest witnessing was  coined by D. Haraway; 
Melanesian eversion was one of the terms M. Strathern used to describe a form of analytic she 
learned from her Mt. Hagen friends in PNG; material semiotics is the descriptive term adopted by 
A.  Mol  and  J.  law;  a  postcolonial  imaginary  of  emergence  is  adopted  by  Verran  (2001)  as  a 
contrast to a foundationist analytic; baroque analysis is a term more recently used by John Law. 
8 Verran(2007: 180) 
9 The  on‐going  perception  of  the  exceptionalism  of  African  economies  feeds  into  a  general 
pessimism about their prospects. As Guyer (2004) puts it, “tolerance of noncomprehension works 
on a threshold principle: so far, no further. By the 1990s, the state of scholarship and the state of 
the world showed that the popular economies of Africa had passed that threshold. General and 
specialist media  alike  started  using  apocalyptic  terms:  ‘the  hopeless  continent’  (cover  of  The 
Economist, Dec 9–16, 2000).” Such portrayals, of course, invite the rest of the world to intervene 
and ‘take over’ such economies—as did European empires in the 19th century. 
10 The  perception  of  a  continuing  inability  to  satisfactorily  explain,  in  Western  terms,  how 
“African thought” is different from that of the West led to a widespread assumption, even among 
well‐meaning commentators, that ‘African thought’ is primitive (see Verran 2001: 11–4). 
11 Verran (2001) can be read as a prolonged critique of foundational empiricism.  
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Relational empiricism is modal analysis of relations between entities that 
can be understood as participants in some (contingent) collective (with no 
distinction made between human and non-human actors). What matters in 
collectives is conservation of the relational order(s) within and through which 
they have life. Relational empiricism thus acknowledges conservation of order as 
an enabling premise. 12 Relational empirical analyses adopt whole–parts 
generalizing where the whole remains only vaguely delineated, but where the 
constitution of the various emergent parts is amenable to precise articulation. 
Those who adopt this approach often overlook one aspect of adopting a 
relational empiricist analytic: a configuring analyst. The in-text, and perhaps also 
the fleshy, analyst is necessarily configured as an emergent part of the collective. 
The position of the detached judging observer, so comfortable for analysts, 
dissolves (Verran 2001: 151, 158). With respect to the collective, analysis is 
necessarily an infra-move not a meta-move, but this infra-move can only be 
achieved by the analyst in the text, so the relational empiricist analyst is a 
complicated tension of author in the flesh and author in the text. A secondary 
premise of relational empiricism is that the entities that emerge in the workings of 
collectives (including analysts) are configured with certain intensive or modal 
properties which account for the performativities of those entities. What a relational 
empiricist analyst aims for is felicitous intervention in the order(s) conserved in the 
work of the collective. 
In pursuing a relational empiricist line of analysis with respect to numbers, I 
am still following an intuition that first arose for me in the early 1980s, when I 
realized that the scientific numbers I was determined to get Yoruba teachers to 
bring to life in their classrooms were distinct from the Yoruba numbers that many 
of the children and teachers were familiar with as they bought and sold in Yoruba 
markets. I intuited that both Yoruba and scientific numbers were active participants in 
collective life and that, with potent political consequences, by adopting specific routines, 
the numbers might be contingently connected and/or separated (2001). 
When mobilizing relational empiricism, analysts are committed to realities 
as emergent, and the foundational empiricist story of numbers as 
representing values in a world ‘out-there’ gives way to a quite different 
account of numbers working in the world. The foundational empiricist 
theory of cardinal numbers as reporting extents to which objects possess 
qualities or attributes which objects somehow inherently possess , loses its 
salience.13 In relational empiricism, numbers are the formal generalizing 
                                                            
12 In  an  analogous  way  sociology  (a  foundational  empiricist  analytic)  accepts  as  its  enabling 
premise that the group is the primary unit of the social. 
13 In  this  paper  I  am  concerned  only with  numbers  performing  quantitative  valuing,  so‐called 
cardinal  numbers  in  foundational  empiricism.  There  is  also  a  lot  to  be  said  about  the 
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unity/multiplicity relation, and the certainty that imbues their working is 
elicited in their capacity to interpellate (99–104). Numbers, working as the 
interpellating relation unity/multiplicity, numbers effect ordering. What sort 
of order? That depends on performative properties which are embedded in 
numbers as they come to life in ‘microworlds’ where complicated routine 
practices ‘clot’ as enumerated entities (159–62).  
So what are the epistemo-cultural properties of numbers? In the past 15 years I 
have proposed several such properties. The first performative property of numbers 
I learned to see was what I call alternative modes of generalizing: numbers enact 
both whole–parts and one–many versions of the unity–multiplicity relation. It was 
by examining the respective workings of these types of numbers, embedded in 
collectives and their life in contemporary Yoruba language and English language 
communities, that I could first articulate the differences between these modes.  
Importantly, these generalizing modes are relational, distinguishable only in 
relation to each other (235).  
Having identified this performative property, a further property of numbers, 
formerly completely invisible, came into view. Numbers can manifest either as 
ontologically singular or ontologically multiple, depending on configurations 
achieved in the different types of socio-technical routines involved in their 
constitution (92-9). This ontological mode is another intensive epistemo-cultural 
property of numbers. More recently, I have argued that numbers can also manifest 
in alternative semiotic modes, as icons, indexes, and symbols (Verran 2010). These 
particular semiotic modalities carry with them the associated modal properties of 
temporal extension—being symbolically future focused or indexically past focused, 
and iconic temporal collapse (Verran 2010, 2012). I propose that these four 
properties enable the possibility of adducing the performativities of the numbers 
displayed in “Stocking up: Securing our marine economy” poster.  
To adduce is to bring forward to a common point, and that is what I have 
done here. From a variety of unlikely sources, I have articulated some of the 
performativities of numbers. By that, I mean some of the possibilities for socio-
technical action that numbers might achieve by virtue of their conceptual formation.  
These performativities render them potent as political and cultural agents. Let me 
list these perfomativities and hence possibilities for socio-technical action: the 
generalizing modalities of numbers; their semiotic mode; the temporalities by 
which those semiotic modes are themselves modified; and the ontological mode 
of numbers. In the next section, adumbrating some of their performative 
                                                                                                                                                                  
performances  of  the  ordinal  numbers  of  foundational  empiricism:  that  is, what  is  involved  in 
ranking, scoring, and sorting with numbers in a relational empiricist framing. 
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properties, I discuss three different sorts of numbers displayed in the Stocking Up: 
Securing our marine economy poster. 
Performances of numbers in the Stocking Up: Securing our marine 
economy poster 
In considering the performative properties of the numbers that the authors of this 
policy paper clearly feel summarise their argument, I begin, not with the first 
number they present, but with the number in the middle of the list, at the point 
where the authors turn to contextualizing their argument. They note that the 
growth rate of long-lived corals in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef has declined by 
15 per cent, which they take as an indicator of continuing environmental 
degradation due to climate change, and which they feel justifies their call for a 
major rethinking of the fundamentals of Australia’s marine environment. I begin 
with this number because its modal or intensive properties are familiar: it typifies 
the exemplary modern fact. 
 
Fifteen per cent is a way of expressing the ratio 15/100 which in turn is a 
simplification of the ratio of two cardinal numbers representing real values. Or 
at least that is how the authors of the scientific papers reporting the phenomenon 
understand it. Some specific corals at a particular place on Australia’s Barrier 
reef grew at an average rate of 1.43 cm per year between 1900 and 1970, but 
only at 1.24 cm per year between 1990 and 2005.14 Growth slowed by 0.19 cm 
per year, which might be expressed by the ratio (0.19/1.24) or 15 per cent which, 
in a foundational empiricist framing, represents the value of the decline in the 
growth rate of long-lived coral. 
Shifting to relational empiricism, I comment on the epistemo-cultural 
properties of the number. This number is an index; it performs indexically. As an 
index it exhibits with a past temporal extension: it points at the growth rates of 
specific pieces of coral growing in a specific place at a specific time in the past. 
                                                            
14De’ath, Lough & Fabricius (2009). 
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The number embeds a one–many generalizing mode: it specifies a unit (cm 
growth per year) and then values through collecting many of those units together. 
Importantly, because this number performs a truth claim, claiming an absolute 
precision in valuing, the number is ontologically singular. Embedding strictly 
standardized material practices, this number implicitly claims that there could no 
different interpretation. It is an exemplary modern fact. 
To discuss the properties of numbers in the way I have in the previous 
paragraph necessarily involves using rather arcane philosophical terminology that 
few readers will relate to. What does such a discussion mean in terms of this 
particular number’s performance? The important aspect of the number, 15 per 
cent, and four more of the numbers displayed in the poster,15 is the making of a 
truth claim about value. In order to do so efficiently and effectively, in common 
with other such numbers, this 15 per cent has been put together through material, 
institutional, and literary practices. 
The second number from the poster that I interrogate is the sort of number 
that is currently causing much puzzlement amongst philosophers of science who 
adopt foundational empiricist framings.16  
 
42 per cent, or 42/100 is, like the number I have just considered, 
arithmetically speaking, a ratio of two cardinal numbers. The denominatorA$2.20 
billion per year has been assiduously assembled in one of the vast counting and 
measuring exercises that go towards constituting Australia’s national accounts. It 
is the total of value of four classes of Australian fish products. 
                                                            
15 42%: the proportion of Australian Commonwealth fish stocks over‐fished or of unknown status: 
A$434–811  million  is  the  estimated  value  Australian  households  are  willing  to  pay  for  a  1% 
improvement  in  the  health  of  the  Great  Barrier  Reef;  A$400  million  is  the  estimated  value 
Australian households are willing to pay to establish new marine protected areas  in the South‐
West Marine Region; 60% is the proportion of frequent fishers who believe that up to 30% of the 
waters off metropolitan Perth should be protected. 
16 See Figg and Hunter (2010). Such numbers have variously been said to represent objects that 
are “intentional stipulations” (Callender and Cohen 2006: 78), “fictional objects” like unicorns or 
Count Dracula (Figg, 2010), “make‐believe objects” as in the dinner party injunction “now let this 
salt shaker represent Madagascar” (Toon 2010), or to “function as parables” (Cartwright 2010). 
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The numerator has quite different origins. This number emerged not through 
counting and measuring by specific people in specific places and specific times, but 
through calculation by a computer. To generate the prediction that the total value of 
Australia’s fish products in 2030 would be A$3.11 billion per year, a carefully 
devised computer programme, plied with rich streams of data, only some of which 
is derived from actual measurements, enfolded the A$2.20 billion per year number 
in a complicated set of calculative processes. This would amount to an increase of 
A$0.91 billion per year. We can thus render the computed increase as a ratio: 
0.91/2.20, which is more felicitously rendered as 42/100, or forty two per cent. 
Whereas A$2.20 billion per year (the denominator), indexing a collection 
of actual fishery products, an accumulation of the value of all fishery products 
landed each day in all Australian fishing ports for the year 2010, is a 
representation, A$3.11 billion in 2030, and hence A$0.91 billion per year, is not a 
representation, and so neither is 42 per cent.  
The cardinal numbers A$2.20 billion and A$3.11 billion purport to 
represent the value of the fish products landed by Australian fishers in 2010 and 
in 2030, respectively. They present as the same sorts of number, and allow the 
seemingly trustworthy claim that we can expect, in certain circumstances, an 
increase of forty two per cent in the value. But let us slow down, even the 
cursory examination I have just made reveals there is a profound difference 
between these two numbers. 
The particular program which generated the denominator of this ratio is 
called IMPACT (International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural 
Commodities and Trade) developed and maintained in the International Food Policy 
Research Institute in Washington DC. Among the categories included in the 
algorithms used to generate this number were the previously mentioned four classes 
of fish products, differentiated as captured or farmed, and including two categories 
of animal feedstuffs made from fishery products. Embedded in this numerator 
number are values very like the denominator number A$2.20 billion per year.17 
As a cardinal number, the denominator A$2.20 billion reports the past. It 
is a representation contrived in an elaborate set of institutional routines which start 
with actual people, perhaps wearing gumboots, weighing boxes of fish of one sort 
or another, and writing figures down in columns on a sheet attached to a clipboard, 
or perhaps in a few places, entering numbers into a computer tablet, that must be 
protected from splashes and fish scales. 
                                                            
17 Table A3 on Eadie & Hoisington(2011: 63)  reports  values attributed  to Delgado,  International 
Fish Policy Research Institute. The numbers appear to be extrapolations derived from Delgado, et 
al. (2003). 
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By contrast, A$3.11 billion is connected to such material routines only 
very weakly, and only to the extent that the numbers generated in such routines 
are incorporated into data sets to be manipulated by computer models. The 
computers in which A$3.11 comes to life need no protection from the wetness 
associated with actual fish and fishers. Similarly the institutional and literary 
routines in which this number is generated are very different to those that give life 
to numbers like A$2.20 billion per year.  
What are some of the epistemo-cultural properties of this complicated 
hybrid number? In working my way towards showing what sort of performance this 
number gives, I start at the point in its construction where a denominator number 
like A$2.20 billion per year, a number which has been derived in careful counting, 
an abstracting one–many generalizing process, is embedded into processes of 
computation being carried out in the computer. Owing to that process, the 
performativity of the number changes. No longer an indexical total (assiduously 
assembled in the past through actual people quantifying actual stuff), it becomes a 
whole. In semiotic terms it becomes an icon where category and value are elided, in 
which there is no distinction to be made between category and value. It now 
performs as an element in a particular order. In being enfolded into what will 
become the numerator number in the working of the computer program, the 
denominator number begins to perform order rather than the quantitative valuing of 
its previous indexical life.  
The processes of the computing undertaken with this newly constituted whole 
then contribute to processes that are constructing new wholes: icons that articulate the 
future. By setting these new wholes, calculated as possibilities appearing in twenty 
years, in proportion with the indexical 2010 total, a purported partial expansion in 
value of Australian fish stocks can be calculated. After twenty years of oceanic 
ecological collapse (“an exogenous declining trend of 1% annually” Delgado et al, 
2003: 10) this purported partial expansion will, it is said, increase substantially—by 
A$0.91 billion per year. This number, too, is an icon where category and value are 
one and the same, and it has various parts and sub-parts, which could easily be read 
off from the computer output by an expert. This number collapses the present into a 
narrowly imagined future, and being the outcome of precisely established and 
monitored standard practices, the number performs as ontologically singular. 
Performing as ontologically singular and rendering the present as various 
apparently precise futures, such numbers as this icon/index hybridized whole– 
parts and one–many generalizations, are pervasive in contemporary public life. 
They increasingly feature in politics and are crucial in generating policy. These 
numbers now carry relations between economy and state. Indeed in the policy 
paper I exhibit here, this number of A$0.91 billion per year (42%) projected 
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increase in the production value of fish, is crucial to the argument. If anything will 
persuade politicians and the citizens they represent, it is this number. It justifies 
taxpayers’ money being spent on establishing and running marine parks and 
protected areas. By justifying permission for one group to fish ‘over-there’, but 
not the other, and disallowing them both from ‘here’, the number even excuses 
differential control of various classes of economic agents, distinguished as they 
are by the socio-technical apparatus they mobilize. 
This number appears similar to the number I previously considered; it has 
all the hallmarks of making a truth claim. When we recognize that this number 
appears, however, to index a future that has not happened and which is 
unknowable, that implicit truth claim cannot be recognised. It is a prediction, a 
prophecy, and it has the performative features that go along with that. While we 
might deplore its dissembling, its seeming to be a truth claim, when recognised as 
a performative number, it is a valid prediction. 
The final number I interrogate is neither a truth claim, nor a prophecy. I 
suggest that it is best interpreted as a slogan. However, just as the predicting 
number 42 per cent performatively imitated a truth claim, so I suggest does this 
sloganeering number A$25 billion. Yet I will argue that this pretence does not 
necessarily detract from its validity as a performative number. Perhaps, given the 
nature of sloganeering performance, it adds to it. 
 
A$25 billion is a large value, so large that it seems to elude the 
comprehension of most numerate people. In addition, the claim that this number 
names the very roughly estimated debt owed by the economy to nature challenges 
our imaginations in a different way. Perhaps it is not surprising that the authors of 
the paper in which this number is displayed make a fuss about it. Of the fifty-two 
pages of argument and evidence in this paper, nine are devoted solely to this 
number. Six are allocated to describing its conceptual design and three to justifying 
the value claimed. Of these nine pages more than half are devoted to showing that 
the value is really much, much bigger than A$25billion, but the authors have “been 
conservative” because in the time available it was not possible to quantify all the 
ecosystems services values provided by Australia’s oceans: for example, with 
 
H. Verran. Numbers Performing Nature in Quantitative Valuing 
34 
NatureCulture 2013 
Copyright owned by the authors 
respect to things like rivers and wetlands, it is not possible to determine where 
oceans begin and end; neither is it possible to determine how to separate Australian 
ocean ecosystem services from global ocean ecosystem services.18 
As a representation of real value this number is a controversial (Verran 2012: 
110–24). The first concern is conceptual and arithmetic. In articulating ecosystem 
services, the authors claim to have identified a debt that Australia’s ocean economy 
owes to nature—the use-value of Australia’s oceans perhaps. They claim that this 
debt the economy owes to nature can be added to the credit generated in economic 
production—the exchange value of Australia’s ocean. Adding the negative number 
25 billion to the positive number 44 billion, oddly, they come up with 69 billion. 
The second problem concerns the physical object that the number A$25 
billion per year claims to value. This object is ineluctably vague, spatially 
indeterminable and existing for eternity. The authors’ claim that they had 
insufficient time to fully quantify the ecosystem services of Australia’s oceans is, 
in fact, made in bad faith. In actuality, the object is not quantifiable because it is 
not a physical object. It is no more quantifiable than unicorns. 
Switching to considering the performance this number makes, we can 
recognize that it is not a modern fact, although the paper’s authors assiduously 
cultivate the impression that it is, or rather that it could be, and will eventually be. 
This number is iconic. In it, category and value are one and the same; it expresses 
an order. Just as a pencil stroke in a geometry exercise book is the materiality of a 
geometric line, the materiality of the enumerated entity is the nine pages in the 
report, and just as a geometric line is temporally eternal, so too is this enumerated 
entity. However, while a geometric line is ontologically singular—there is a 
thoroughly standard (and rather simple) way to constitute it, there is much 
controversy over how to conceptualise ecosystems services and over how to value 
them. This enumerated entity is ontologically multiple; its multiple forms might 
be connected or separated in contingent ways.19 
As is made clear in this report, this enumerated entity is a whole of many 
parts and sub-parts. And each of these parts and sub-parts is iconic. As a 
performed quantitative value, this number fails. Yet despite this, in the paper, 
the number is flaunted. It takes pride of place in a series of numbers displayed in 
a poster in a paper produced by a well-respected think-tank. And in other 
contexts, too, numbers purporting to represent values for ecosystem values get a 
                                                            
18 Eadie & Hoisington(2011: 14) 
19 In  justifying  the  particular  entity  they  chose  to  bring  to  life  the  authors  note:  “We  used  a 
preference‐based  approach  which  assumes  that  the  value  of  ecosystem  services  can  be 
estimated by observing how humans interact with, or use the products provided by ecosystems. 
Within this approach we have accounted only for use values. We have not considered any non‐
use of existence values”.(Foucault 2008: 12) 
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remarkably good press.20 What to make of this puzzling phenomenon, where a 
number that is clearly only pretending to perform quantitative valuing is 
mobilised when making a serious argument?  
I suggest that it is useful to think of A$25 billion as words, to take the 
appearance of this number at the head of a list of numbers as performing like a shouted 
slogan.21 In being uttered as a slogan, “Australians owe their oceanic nature twenty-five 
billion dollars!” might aim to convince and/or enlighten. Or more forcefully, as they 
occupy Bondi Beach, “Twenty-five billion Australian dollars, or more!” someone 
might shout, adding “When are you going to pay?” As performance—as an act that 
makes clear that this is the performance of an act that seeks to invoke conventional 
rights and/or commitments—this number would be felicitous.  
Recognizing A$25 billion per year performatively as a slogan, new 
questions arise. Is it good or bad to pretend to value an entity precisely, when 
the entity itself is a fiction? Is it good or bad to proclaim this number as the 
value of a debt, and to utter that number in order to enlighten, or to get 
recognition that it has been uttered, and impose obligations on those who 
acknowledge its utterance? How to define a felicitous utterance here? The 
criteria for good and bad lie in the aesthetics of the art of politics and are not 
concerned with facts about the ocean or its fish. This question concerns the 
conduct of environmental politics as affect. 
When we consider the epistemo-cultural properties of the numbers 
displayed on the poster, it is perhaps this sloganeering number that presents the 
most interesting performance. While it is garbed in the vestments of 
disinterestedness that go along with modern fact indexical numbers, it is in 
actuality performing polemic promoting the highly interested ordering of ‘nature’ 
as constituted by political liberalism. But that does not invalidate its performance 
of quantitative valuing. In more or less successfully impersonating modern fact 
quantitative valuing, this number proves itself effective as a slogan. It also reveals 
something more general about numbering associated with nature. In performing 
quantifying valuing, numbers effect an order of political economy that brings into 
being quantifiable and hence manageable nature. 
                                                            
20 For  example  The Global  Footprint Network, which  spends much  of  its  resources  calculating 
ecosystems  services  values,  was  recently  named  as  among  the  world’s  top  100  NGOs 
http://theglobaljournal.net/top100NGOs/;  In  January  2012,  the  Natural  History  Museum  in 
London initiated a public debate over the question “Can we put a price on nature?” 
http://www.nhm.ac.uk/nature‐online/biodiversity/earth‐debates/value‐of‐nature/index.html 
21 To use the terms of Austin  (1962) the number  is a  locution;  its utterance, or publication  in a 
graphic form such as this poster is perlocutionary act. 
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Conclusion 
In adumbrating some of the epistemo-cultural properties of some found numbers, I 
have been able to reveal how they perform in Australian environmental policy 
development understood as a realm of governmentality. The numbers displayed on the 
poster all perform qualitative valuing as ordering, but several differing moments of that 
ordering are displayed. Most of the numbers perform as backward-looking truth claims, 
a thoroughly familiar modern form of epistemo-cultural ordering. These numbers index 
specific valuation practices in actual past times and places. One number performs as a 
prediction of a future that will, the authors of the paper argue, be effected by enacting a 
particular policy in the present. Another performs as a slogan that expresses the present 
of contemporary Australian environmental governmentality which has in the past 
fifteen years, radically extended the range of entities that might be bought and sold.  
Nature—a very particular nature that humanity can do business with is 
revealed as an infrastructure of multiple temporal moments, a pervasive order, the 
“permanent correlative” of Australia’s neo-liberal environmental governmentality. 
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